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The relation between worker voice and strikes is a long one. For most of the past 200 
years, the withdrawal of labour has been the principal, perhaps, quintessential expression of 
collective worker voice.2  This was true whether workers were organized on a craft or an 
industrial basis, although the pattern of organization certainly affected the form that strikes 
took.3  The frequency and length of strikes varied considerably over time and place, but the 
strike remained the weapon of choice if a weapon was needed to achieve common workplace 
objectives.4  However, the venerable age of this practice does not guarantee its continuation.  
Like a roof with a slow leak, one day a storm may come and suddenly the roof collapses, its 
supporting structure irreparably weakened, the victim of rot gone undetected for too long.  Have 
we reached this point with strikes?  In most advanced capitalist countries, we have witnessed the 
collapse of the strike over the last few decades.  Have the structural and legal conditions that 
supported strikes eroded so thoroughly that exhortations to revive the strike are as futile as 
planning to raise a roof without first making sure there is a structure in place that can support it?  
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a definitive answer the question of the future 
of strikes as the quintessential expression of collective worker voice, but rather to contribute 
toward a discussion of it by providing an overview of the literature in three strike-related areas: 
recent data on the incidence of strikes; an examination of the role that law plays in influencing 
strike incidence; and speculation on the future of collective worker resistance.   
However, before launching into these other topics, it will be helpful by way of 
introduction to spend a little time identifying the ways in which worker voice has been connected 
to strike activity.5  The most frequent and popular view of strikes is as an economic weapon that 
enables workers to enjoy some countervailing power and make collective bargaining meaningful.  
The absence of a right to strike, or more generally, the absence of an effective threat to 
collectively withdraw labour and put economic pressure on employers, is said to transform  
collective bargaining into “collective begging.”6  In Canada, the Woods Task Force, 
which in 1967 articulated the underlying principles of the post-World War II industrial relations 
2 Peter Rachleff, ‘Is the Strike Dead? An Historical Look at the Future’ (2003) 12:2 New Labor Forum 87. For a discussion of 
earlier forms of collective labour protest, including rioting and machine breaking, see P.K. Edwards, Conflict at Work (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford 1986) ch. 4.  Edwards makes the important analytic point that forms of protest are linked to changing relations 
of production, so that strikes should not be seen simply as a “drift to modernity” (112).  This insight has important implications 
for discussions of the future of collective action, to which we will return in the last section of the paper. 
3 Joe Burns, Reviving the Strike (Ig Publishing, New York 2012) 14-17. 
4 The incidence of strikes is not a good measure of the strength of worker voice.  More important is the plausibility of the threat 
of the strike.  Thus in a world in which workers’ organization is strong, employers may find it it is in their self-interest to 
cooperate with labour and make concessions, rather than to fight.  See Erik Olin Wright, ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class 
Interests, and Class Compromise’ (2000) 105 AJS 957.  It is implausible that the current decline in strikes reflects growing 
working-class strength.  Union densities are declining as is labour’s share of national income.  For Canadian data, see Gary Sran 
and others, Unions Matter (Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights, Ottawa 2013). For U.S. data, see Fred Magdoff and John 
Bellamy Foster, ‘Class War and Labor’s Declining Share’ (2013) 64 MR, 1. 
5 For an excellent overview, see Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (OUP, Oxford 2003) 
39-73.  
6 The origin of the term is unknown.  Its earliest use, identified through a search of Google Books Ngram Reader, was in 1921.  It 
was popularized by an article in Time magazine, ‘U.S. At War: No Collective Begging’ Time (25 September 1944) quoting a 
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system, stated that strikes are “an indispensable part of the Canadian industrial relations system”7 
and that “[t]he acceptance of collective bargaining carries with it a concomitant recognition of 
the right to invoke the economic sanction of the strike and the lockout.”8   
The connection between voice and strikes, however, is not just limited to the achievement 
of better terms and conditions of employment.  Strikes are often viewed as a means for workers 
to exercise democratic voice.  Thus, the Woods Task Force asserted that strikes had become “a 
part of the whole democratic system.”9  What they meant was that trade unionism contributed to 
the development of industrial democracy, the ability of workers to participate in workplace 
governance, and not just the determination of terms and conditions of employment.  Of course, 
the forms that industrial democracy could take varied considerably, but in the North American 
context, where almost any form of codetermination or social dialogue was beyond the pale, 
collective bargaining and its associated institutions were the principal vehicle for worker 
participation in workplace governance.10   
State policy, however, never fully embraced this goal, and in particular was deeply 
opposed to permitting strikes as a vehicle for the expression of worker voice over day to day 
workplace governance issues.11  In the Wagner Act model, grievance arbitration was to be the 
mechanism for resolving these disputes and strikes during the life of the collective agreement 
were prohibited, either by legislation (Canada) or by the express or implied terms of the 
collective agreement (US).  More recently Australia and New Zealand have also prohibited mid-
term strikes However, prohibitions on strikes do not always stop workers from engaging in 
unauthorized strikes to protest against managerial decision-making and, perhaps, official union 
inaction.  Indeed, there have been times when so-called wildcat strikes were quite frequent and 
viewed with alarm by those who thought of institutionalized collective bargaining primarily as a 
means for maintaining industrial order12.  In the UK, where strikes during the life of a collective 
disgruntled union member opposed to the wartime no strike pledge who declared,“Hell, we haven’t even got collective begging, 
let alone collective bargaining.” Barrett, Grant, ‘Collective Begging’ (Online Dictionary) 
<http://www.waywordradio.org/collective_begging_1/> accessed 16 September 2013.  Its use declined in the 1950s, but attained 
even greater popularity in the 1960s and 70s as public sector unions fought to obtain formal collective bargaining rights and the 
right to strike. See Google Ngram Viewer, ‘Collective Begging’ 
<http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=collective+begging&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing
=3&share> accessed 16 September 2013. (I am indebted to Bob Sink for providing me with this link.) The term is now generally 
used to describe collective bargaining schemes in which workers lack an effect right to strike.  For example, see Daniel Pollitt, 
‘McKay Radio Turn it Off, Tune it Out’ (1991) 25 U SF L Rev 295, 297 (“In sum, without the right to strike, collective 
bargaining denigrates into collective begging.”).  NLRB v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 304 US 333 (1938) allowed employers 
to hire permanent replacement workers during a strike.  
7 Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, ‘Canadian Industrial Relations’ PCO (1968) [39], [408].  
8 Ibid [605]. 
9 Ibid [608]. 
10 Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell J. Harris (eds), Industrial Democracy in America (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1993). 
11 Josiah B. Lambert, If the Workers took a Notion: The Right to Strike and American Political Development (Cornell University 
Press, New York 2005). 
12 For Canada, see L Briskin, ‘Public Sector Militancy, Feminization, and Employer Aggression’ in Sjaak van der Velden et al. 
(eds), Strikes Around the World (Aksant, Amsterdam 2007) 86, 95-96. (Overall, between 1960 and 2004, 18% of strikes were 
wildcats.  At their peak in 1974, 40% of all strikes were wildcats). Official statistics on wildcat strikes are not kept in the U.S.  
For a discussion, see R Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity (University of California Press, Berkeley 1988) 59-65.  For the UK, see D 
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agreement were not illegal, workers faced fewer impediments to engaging in direct action to 
express their dissatisfaction with management actions.  Notably, most strikes before 1980 were 
not officially supported by trade unions.  The situation under current UK law is quite different.  
Mid-term strikes are still not prohibited, but like other strikes they must be ‘official’ if 
participating workers are to be immune from the threat of dismissal for the protected period.  
Where strike action is ‘unofficial’ the employment tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with an 
unfair dismissal claim by the dismissed striker.  The result is that workers participating in 
unofficial strikes can be selectively dismissed.   It is also important to note that there are 
significant hurdles to making strikes official.13 
A related but far more controversial question is the link between strikes and political 
democracy and, in particular, the role of strikes aimed at influencing government policies.  
Leaving aside the question of strikes aimed at overthrowing governments, the major objection to 
political strikes that seek to influence government policies that affect the interests of workers is 
that economic pressure may disrupt the ‘normal’ legislative and political process.  The difficulty 
with that argument is that is fails to take into account the ways that capital routinely influences 
government policy by the threat to withdraw investment if business friendly policies are not 
pursued.14  The fact that many individual capitals can be gathered within a corporation, which is 
a distinct legal person, may mask its collective character, but it does not change it.15  Moreover, 
the boundaries between a political strike and a collective bargaining strike become blurred in the 
context of the public sector where ‘ordinary’ government legislation and executive action, let 
alone ‘special’ legislation targeting particular negotiations, so pervasively influences bargaining 
outcomes.16  The Woods Task Force anticipated this situation and seemed resigned to the 
inevitability of political strikes.17 These arguments, however, have had little legal traction.  In 
Canada, political strikes are almost always unlawful and, indeed, at one time were liable to be 
criminally prosecuted as seditious conspiracies.18 In New Zealand and Australia political strikes 
are unlawful and participants are subject to various penalties.19 In the United Kingdom political 
strikers lose their statutory immunity from unfair dismissal and unions may become liable for 
economic torts, although there is a very small chance this may change as a result of the UK’s 
Lyddon, ‘From Strike Wave to Strike Drought’ in Strikes (see above in this note) 338.  In the UK, there is some evidence that 
younger workers engage in collective action to resolve workplace complaints, but this does not seem to include strikes.  See, 
Anna Pollert, ‘Spheres of collectivism: Group Action and Perspectives on Trade Unions Among The Low-Paid Unorganized 
With Problems at Work’ (2010) 34 Capital & Class 115.  
13 Pascale Lorber and Tonia Novitz, Industrial Relations Law in the UK (Intersentia, Cambridge 2012) 113. 
14 For an insightful discussion, see Novitz (n 5) 54-64. 
15 Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, ‘Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational 
Form’ (1980) 1 Political Power and Social Theory 67.  
16 Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms (Garamond Press, Toronto 
2003). 
17 “The political strike cannot be done away with by legislation; and it is a phenomenon that might become more common as 
governments becomes increasingly involved in economic and social planning as well as in industrial relations.” Task Force on 
Labour Relations (n 7) [610]. 
18 Domglas Ltd. [1976] OLRB Rep, October 569 (Ontario Labour Relations Board Reporter); Reinhold Kramer  and Tom 
Mitchell, When the State Trembled (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2010).  
19 B Brooks, ‘Australia’ in R Blanpain (ed), International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations (University of 
Leuven, Belgium 2009) 233; G Anderson, ‘New Zealand’ in Blanplain (see above in this note) 206-07. 
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international obligations under the ILO and the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
situation is more ambiguous in the United States.20   
Finally, strikes have been viewed not merely as a manifestation of collective worker 
voice, but as an activity that produces higher levels of class consciousness, organization and, 
ultimately, power.  This Marxist notion views consciousness as the product of human activity, so 
that although workers’ interests may be structurally in conflict with those of capital, it is through 
the process of confrontation that workers are transformed and become a class for itself.21  The 
dialectical relationship between social activity and consciousness, of course, is not uniquely 
linked to participation in strikes, but in a world in which the repertoire of confrontation practices 
was built around the strike, their disappearance is deeply concerning and raises the pressing 
questions of whether the strike can be revived and if not whether new repertoires are in the 
making. We will return to these questions later in this chapter, but next we turn to evidence on 
the extent of strike activity.  
1. The Withering Away of the Strike?
Anyone familiar with the literature on strike activity should be reluctant to use the above 
subtitle lest they suffer the same fate as functionalist industrial relations scholars in the 1950s 
who viewed the decline in strikes they witnessed evidence for their theory that industrial conflict 
would decline in advanced industrialized societies which had become more adept at containing, 
redirecting and controlling the sources and manifestations of unrest.22  That prediction, of course, 
turned out to be spectacularly wrong soon after it was made, as a massive strike wave hit 
industrialized countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The discussion of recent strike trends 
here, therefore, disavows any broader claim about its significance for the future.  Rather, Figure 
1simply presents, for the convenience of readers, previously published data on the decline in 
strike activity in the five common law countries covered by this project from 1960 to 2006.23 
20 Keith Ewing and John Hendy, Days of Action: The Legality of Protest Strikes Against Government Cuts (Institute for 
Employment Rights, Liverpool 2011); Seth Kupferberg, ‘Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights’ (1985) 71 Va L 
Rev 685.   
21 Fantasia (n 12) 3. This is not to imply that structural processes are disconnected from cultural ones and that struggle emerges 
either spontaneously or under material conditions that impede social action.  Rather, the emphasis is on their dialectical 
interaction and the possibility of vicious or virtuous circles. 
22 Clark Kerr and others, Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Industrial Growth (OUP, 
New York 1964) 184. 
23 van der Velden (n 12); John Goddard, ‘What Happened to Strikes?’(2011) 49 Brit J Ind Relat 282. 
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Figure 1 
Days Lost to Disputes Per Thousand Workers 
Sources: van der Velden (n 12) 111, 152, 194, 365; Domenic Hale, ‘International Comparisons of Labour Disputes 
in 2006’ (2008) 2 ELMR 32.  
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The strike data is, well, striking, but to make the evidence of decline even clearer Figure 
2 below presents the trend lines for the five countries.  Regardless of the starting point, there is a 
convergence toward quiescence, bordering on disappearance, a trend noted by Shalev in the early 
1990s.24   
We will turn to discuss the reasons for this development, but first I want to explore 
whether national statistics hide within them distortions or variations that might be notable.  A 
brief overview of this kind cannot undertake a review of each of the five cases, so I will only 
consider the Canadian data.  In particular, I want to consider whether the declining strike rate is 
an artifact of the decline in union membership and whether there are different trends for public 
and private sector strike rates. 
Figure 3 presents a comparison of the strike rate calculated per 1000 employees and the 
strike rate per 1000 union members.  If the decline was simply a function of the decline in union 
density, then one would expect the union member strike rate to remain flat while the employee 
strike late declined.  However, the figure shows that the union member strike rate is declining 
more rapidly than the employee strike rate, indicating that the decline in union density explains 
24 M Shalev, ‘The Resurgence of Labour Quiescence’ in Mario Regini (ed), The Future of Labour Movements (Sage, London 
1992). 
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very little of the total decline in strike activity.  
 
Figure 4 compares changes in strike rates for public and private sector workers.  Given 
the great difference in the trajectory of union densities in these two sectors, with public sector 
density remaining high, while private sector union density declining, it might have been thought 
that the public sector strike rate would not decline as rapidly as the private sector strike rate, 
especially given the findings of previous studies that strike activity varied with union 
membership.25  But this is not the case for Canada over the period covered by this chart (1979-
2007).  While for the most part the strike rate of public sector workers has been higher than that 
of private sector workers, and more uneven because of the size of particular strikes, the strike 
rate is declining at about the same rate as it is for private sector workers.26  
Of course, if we did a more refined set of sectoral trend lines, we might discover some 
differences, but it is unlikely to change the overall picture.  In Canada, and probably in the other 
jurisdictions, union members are striking less frequently now than they have in the past and the 
rate of public sector strikes, despite higher union densities, is declining about as rapidly as the 
rate of private sector strike. In short, the data suggest that the decline is real and pervasive. 
 
                                                 
25 For example, see Shalev (n 25) 118.  
26 But see M Gunderson and F Reid, ‘Public Sector Strikes in Canada’ in Gene Swimmer and Mark Thompson (eds), Public 
Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada (IRC Press/Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON 1995) 135.  
Their calculation is based on strike days as a percentage of days worked and their data run to 1991. 
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2. The Causes of Labour Quiescence: What’s Labour Law Got to Do with It? 
The challenge of explaining patterns of strike activity have intrigued numerous scholars. 
At certain moments, particular theories seemed to have a high order of explanatory power, but 
subsequent events defeated their predictions, sending scholars scurrying to find new theories that 
better fit the emerging data.  For example, a consensus had emerged that there was an association 
between strike incidence and the business cycle.27 Later, institutional factors came to be more 
heavily weighed, focusing initially on patterns of working-class mobilization and the extent to 
which labour was incorporated into political institutions.  Yet this explanation too was found 
wanting a little over a decade after it was published.28   Hence caution must be exercised by 
anyone offering to explain the pattern we have observed above. 
The approach proposed here builds on work by Michael Shalev, James Piazza and Robert 
Brym.  It starts from the proposition that there are structural factors that significantly shape the 
environment for strikes but that institutional factors mediate their effects to a degree.29  At a 
                                                 
27 For example, Albert Rees, ‘Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations’ (1952) 60 J Polit Econ 371.   
28 Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, ‘Strikes, Power and Politics in the Western Nations’ (1980) 1 Political Power and Social 
Theory 301; Shalev (n 25) 110.  
29 Shalev (n 25); James A. Piazza, ‘Globalizing Quiescence: Globalization, Union Density and Strikes in 15 Industrialized 
Countries’ (2005) 26 Econ Ind Democracy 289; R Brym, ‘Affluence, Power, and Strikes in Canada, 1973-2005’ in Edward 
Sources: Days lost due to strikes by sector provided by 
Robert Hebdon; Public and Private Sector Employment 
from Historical Labour Force Review, 2010 
10 
 
structural level, the focus is on the ensemble of economic, political, cultural and ideological 
arrangements that constitute a social structure of accumulation.30  The dominant shift that has 
occurred since World War II is the shift from the social democratic or Keynesian welfare state to 
the Neo-Liberalism, which David Harvey has characterized as “a political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.”31 A key 
strategy of this project was to strip away the buffers that protected workers from being fully 
exposed to capitalist market ordering. Internationally, this was achieved through globalization, a 
process that opened up national economies to greater international competition, while 
domestically the social wage, welfare provision, and other entitlements were scaled back to 
increase the labour market dependency of the vast majority of the population.   At the same time, 
employers engaged in large-scale workplace restructuring, relocating production in the global 
south, downsizing local operations, outsourcing into global production networks, substituting 
contractors for employees, making greater use of temporary employees, etc.32 Although there are 
significant differences in the paths of the jurisdictions under consideration here, they are all 
operating within this global, neo-liberal structural shift.   
In the face of these challenges, the capacities organized labour had developed in the post-
World War II era began to erode and with it their ability to buffer workers against these changes.  
To a great extent, unions adopted a defensive posture, desperately trying to hold on to past gains 
often by accepting concessions, such as two-tier wages that protected existing members but put 
new hires on a lower wage scale with limited prospects for ever catching up. Resort to traditional 
repertoires of resistance, whether in the form of strikes, as we have seen, or other tactics such as 
work-to-rule campaigns and plant occupations became less frequent. Perhaps even more 
fundamentally, neo-liberalism involved a cultural revolution that undermined the “infrastructures 
of dissent” that had sustained the limited forms of union and working-class solidarity in an 
earlier era.  The ability to imagine it was possible to challenge the neo-liberal order was being 
lost. 33 
Labour law can be productively viewed as a mediating institution that can either buffer 
workers against these structural changes or enable them so that they bear more heavily on 
workers.  For example, the law regulating strikes could be changed to prohibit replacement 
workers in the hope that it will help offset the unfavourable circumstances facing organized 
labour or strikes could be prohibited or picketing rights restricted to undermine the capacity of 
unionized workers to resist their greater exposure to market forces.  As well, labour law may 
                                                                                                                                                             
Grabb and Neil Guppy (eds), Social Inequality in Canada: Patterns, Problems, Policies (5th edn Pearson Prentice Hall, Toronto 
2009). 
30 See generally Terrence McDonagh, Michael Reich and David M. Kotz (eds), Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010). 
31 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, Oxford 2005) 19 (emphasis in the original). 
32 Guy Standing, The Precariat (Bloomsbury, London 2011); Leah Vosko (ed), Precarious Employment (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, Montreal 2006). 
33 S Gindin, ‘Rethinking Unions, Registering Socialism’ in Leo Panitch, Gregory Albo and Vivek Chibber (eds), Socialist 
Register 2013: The Question of Strategy (Merlin Press, Pontypool, Wales 2013) 26; David McNally, Global Slump: The 
Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance (Fernwood Publishing, Black Point, Nova Scotia 2011); A Sears, ‘The End of 
20th-Century Socialism?’ (Summer 2007) 61 New Socialist Magazine 5. 
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remain fairly stable, but because the environment in which it operates has changed dramatically, 
the ability of workers to strike successfully diminishes over time.    
There are three dimensions of labour law that are most directly involved in this analysis.  
First, there is the freedom to strike, which refers to whether and in what circumstances strikes are 
legally permissible.  Second, there is the right to strike, which refers to provisions in the law that 
protect the exercise of the freedom to strike, such as protection against dismissal or a right to 
reinstatement.34  Finally, there is the law of industrial action that determines what actions 
striking workers can take to make their strike effective.  In the section that follows, I offer a brief 
and preliminary assessment of the ways in which the law regulating strikes has operated as a 
mediating variable in the countries covered by this project.   
Canada 
It is important to note that most collective bargaining is governed by provincial law and 
so there are many collective bargaining statutes, although at least with private sector all 
legislation is based on the Wagner Act model, which imposes significant restrictions on the 
freedom to strike.  Most notably, recognition and mid-term strikes are prohibited and replaced by 
an administrative recognition procedure and binding grievance arbitration respectively.  
Generally, strikes are only legal after recognition when no collective agreement is in force.  But 
even then, there are procedural requirements that must be met, including completion of a 
conciliation process and the taking of a strike vote. Unlawful strikes can result in serious 
penalties for both the union and participating members.35  Apart from restrictions on the freedom 
to strike, the law also protects striking workers in two ways.  First, it provides that strikers retain 
their status as employees for the purposes of labour statutes and, second, workers have a right to 
return to their jobs within a certain time (e.g. six months).  Only Quebec and British Columbia 
ban temporary replacement workers.36 Finally, the law of picketing has become somewhat less 
restrictive over the last thirty years or so as some provinces have limited the availability of 
labour injunctions and the Supreme Court of Canada altered the common law so that secondary 
action is not per se tortious.37   
The major change to private sector collective bargaining legislation has been the abolition 
of card-count certifications in most provinces, resulting in a near exclusive reliance on 
certification elections.  While this change does not directly affect the freedom to strike, studies 
have demonstrated that it has contributed to a decline in union density, which would undermine 
                                                 
34 Here I am drawing on Hohfeld’s distinction between freedoms and rights, which I believe is helpful because it enables us to 
more precisely describe the way strikes are regulated by law.  So when I say there is a freedom to strike I mean that the 
government and employers have no right to prohibit workers from striking or stop them from doing so.  When I refer to a right to 
strike I mean that governments and employers have a duty not to retaliate or take other adverse action against striking workers or 
their unions for engaging in strikes.  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’(1913) 23 Yale LJ 28.  
35 For an overview, see Donald D. Carter and others, Labour Law in Canada (5th edn Butterworths, Markham 2002); Judy Fudge 
and Eric Tucker, ‘The Freedom to Strike in Canada: A Brief Legal History’ (2010) 15 Can Lab & Emp LJ 333. 
36 Quebec since 1978 and British Columbia since 1993.  Ontario had a partial ban on temporary replacements from 1993 to 1995. 
37 For an overview, see George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law (2nd edn Canada Law Book, Aurora 2003) [11.720]; 
R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. 2002 SCC 8 . 
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bargaining strength and make unions more reluctant to strike.  Dachis and Hebdon found that the 
introduction of mandatory secret ballots results in a decrease in strike frequency, but that the 
effect is weakly statistically significant and so at best would explain only a small part of the 
decline.38  More generally, it is fair to conclude that changes to private collective bargaining law 
have not been a significant cause of the decline in private sector strike activity, but that in the 
context of less favourable structural conditions private sectors workers are less able to 
successfully use the limited freedom and right to strike and picket that the law provides. 
The story is different for the public sector, where government intervention in strikes has 
increased over time, even though the baseline was more restrictive than in the private sector. 
When public sector collective bargaining legislation was first enacted in the 1960s, not only did 
the law impose the same limits on the freedom to strike that were imposed in the private sector, 
but there were additional ones as well, including absolute prohibitions and essential service 
designations where the public interest could be adversely affected.  Where strikes were 
prohibited or severely limited, binding interest arbitration by a neutral third party was the most 
commonly substituted dispute resolution mechanism.  However, as Keynesianism began to be 
supplanted by neoliberalism, governments found that the already restrictive public sector 
collective bargaining regime was not restrictive enough and they frequently imposed further 
limits on the freedom to strike in a number of ways.  There has been increasing use of ad hoc 
measures, like back to work legislation ending strikes or wage restraint legislation that made 
strikes illegal either by outright prohibitions or by extending the term of existing collective 
agreements so that a strike would violate the ban on mid-term strikes.  As well, governments 
have also expanded essential service designations, which deprive more workers of the freedom to 
strike.  Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz have aptly characterized the sum total of these changes 
as “permanent exceptionalism.”39  
There is little empirical evidence on the combined impact of these interventions on strike 
incidence.  Dachis and Hebdon find that an essential service designation does not significantly 
affect the likelihood of a strike and that following back-to-work legislation it is more likely that 
government will intervene in the next contract.40 Perhaps the most that can be said is that 
changes in public sector labour law make a marginal independent contribution to the decline in 
public sector strike frequency.  More importantly, they are part of a larger government strategy 
of imposing public sector wage restraint and creating an environment in which public and private 
sector workers’ expectations will be diminished.   
 
 
United States 
                                                 
38 Adams (nt 38) 13. 
39 Panitch (nt 17).  More generally, see M Thompson and P Jalette, ‘Public Sector Collective Bargaining’ in Morley Gunderson 
and Daphne Taras (eds), Canadian Labour and Employment Relations (6th edn Pearson, Addison, Wesley, Toronto 2009); Joseph 
B. Rose, ‘Public Sector Collective Bargaining: From Retrenchment to Consolidation’ (2004) 59 Indust Relations 271. 
40 Adams, (nt 38) 12, 17.  
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The story in the United States is perhaps best understood as one in which the erosion of 
labour rights in the decades after the 1935 Wagner Act removed important institutional buffers 
that became increasingly significant in the late 1970s with the turn to neo-liberalism, as the non-
union employers more fiercely resisted the unionization of their employees and unionized 
employers fought to weaken the collective agreements that bound them.  The result was a sharp 
decline in private sector collective bargaining density and strike incidence.   
It is notable that the Wagner Act imposed fewer restrictions on strikes than the Canadian 
law that was modeled on it.  The power of federal courts to issue labour injunctions in non-
violent strikes, including secondary action, was removed in 1932 by the Norris-La Guardia 
Act.41  The Wagner Act itself famously protected the right to engage in concerted activity in 
section 7 and section 13 specified that nothing in the Act should be “construed so as either to 
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or 
qualifications on that right.”42  Neither mandatory conciliation nor strike votes were stipulated as 
preconditions of strike legality.   
Despite the Act’s broad statutory language, legislation and labour board and judicial 
decisions began to restrict the freedom to strike in the decades after its enactment.43  The 1947 
Taft-Hartley Act prohibited jurisdictional strikes, wildcat strikes, strikes by federal government 
employees and, most importantly, secondary action.  It required unions and employers to give 80 
days notice before striking or locking out and authorized the President to intervene in strikes that 
imperiled the national health.  This included the power to appoint of a board of inquiry and, more 
importantly, authorized the Attorney General to seek an injunction while the board sought to 
resolve the dispute.  Finally, the law strengthened the powers of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) to enjoin strikes and gave employers the right to sue for damages resulting from 
secondary action or from strikes in breach of the collective agreement.44     
The United States Supreme Court (USSC) also played a crucial role in restricting the 
right and freedom to strike.  The Wagner Act neither prohibited mid-term strikes nor required 
binding interest arbitration to resolve disagreements over the interpretation and application of the 
collective agreements.  While many collective agreements contained no-strike clauses, it was 
difficult to enforce them until 1957 when the USSC interpreted a provision of the Taft-Hartley 
Act as authorizing federal courts to enjoin strikes where the agreement contained a no-strike 
pledge.  Three years later, in the so-called Steelworkers’ Trilogy, the USSC ruled that even in the 
absence of a no-strike clause, there was a legal presumption that mid-term strikes were 
prohibited and disputes were to be resolved by arbitration. The court later held that unions that 
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breached the collective agreement could be sued and that a strike in violation of the express or 
implied no-strike pledge could be enjoined, notwithstanding the Norris-LaGuardia Act.45 
Another limitation on the right to strike developed out of the distinction between 
mandatory and permissive bargaining issues, a distinction not found in statute but created by the 
NLRB.  Its power to make this distinction was upheld by the USSC in 1958.  Mandatory issues 
are ones that the parties must bargain over if one of them wishes and can be bargained to impasse 
while permissive ones, which relate to matters that are at the core of entrepreneurial control, are 
not subject to the duty to bargain in good faith and cannot be bargained to impasse.  As a result, 
unions cannot legally strike over crucial issues, such as technological change and changes in the 
production process, and the tendency over time has been for the scope of permissive bargaining 
issues to grow.46 
The most significant judicial decision affecting strikes, however, has been the 1938 
judgment in Mackay Radio, in which the USSC held that employers had the right to hire 
permanent replacement workers.  Initially, the use of permanent replacements was infrequent, 
largely limited to the southern United States where opposition to unionization remained fierce.  
This began to change in the 1970s as employers more aggressively opposed unions, but it was 
after President Reagan ordered the hiring of permanent replacement workers in the 1981 strike 
by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers’ Organization (PATCO) that the use of replacements 
became more widespread.  At the same time, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions 
that provided greater protection to permanent replacements.47  The combination of low union 
density, weak bargaining power and a legal framework that provides striking workers with no 
buffers against hyper-competitive labour markets understandably has made unionized workers 
reluctant to collectively withdraw their labour.   
With private sector unionism weakened, politicians have increasingly focused attention 
on limiting public sector unions and collective bargaining.  The focus here, however, has not 
been on strikes, since the freedom of public sector workers to strike was already quite limited.  
Rather, most changes in public sector labour law have aimed to give government greater control 
over interest arbitration, the commonly provided to resolve disputes when strikes are prohibited, 
so that they can impose wage restraint.48 
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In sum, the right to strike was incrementally eroded in the decades following the 
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts. The cumulative potential of these changes 
to break strikes was not immediately apparent until the 1970s when employer resistance to 
collective bargaining increased dramatically.  The union-avoidance industry, which grew to meet 
the demand, was able to exploit the law and raise the cost of strikes to unionized workers so 
steeply that the tactic often appears suicidal.   
United Kingdom 
Legal change has also played a significant role in reducing the incidence of strikes in the 
United Kingdom, but unlike in the United States it did not precede the neo-liberal turn but rather 
was an expression of it.  The starting point of UK strike law is also quite different.  For most of 
the twentieth century, the law was based on a statutory immunity from the common law, which 
in the nineteenth century had constructed legal doctrines that exposed striking workers and 
unions to extensive legal liabilities for the harms caused by strikes.  This approach is traced back 
to the 1906 Trade Disputes Act (TDA), which immunized trade unions taking industrial action in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute from tort liability.  This produced a broad 
freedom to strike.  However, there was no legal right to strike in that striking workers could be 
dismissed for breaching their contracts of employment and their re-employment depended on the 
outcome of the strike.  Moreover, collective agreements were not legally binding.  The result was 
an industrial relations system in which strikes were quite frequent, many of them being unofficial 
actions undertaken locally to address workplace grievances.49 
The 1968-74 strike wave triggered the first significant effort to use law to reduce the 
incidence of strikes.  In 1971, the Conservative government enacted the Industrial Relations Act 
(IRA), which aimed to force unions into a legalized framework that drew on elements of 
American labour law: trade union immunities for strike activity were narrowed; state emergency 
powers to intervene in strikes were expanded and no-strike agreements were encouraged.  Trade 
unions were having none of it and for the most part they boycotted the IRA’s institutions.  When 
the Labour Party formed the next government in 1974, it repealed the IRA, restored the TDA and 
tried to close judicial loopholes in the immunities opened up by a hostile judiciary.  But no 
positive right to strike was enacted, in large measure because the trade union movement 
preferred the immunity-based approach.  In retrospect this may have been a strategic mistake, but 
it provided the labour movement with the legal freedom it won it the early twentieth century to 
conduct strikes with limited exposure to legal liabilities. 
This came to an end in 1979 when the Thatcher Conservatives came to power after a 
massive strike wave in 1978-79, triggered by union opposition to the Labour government’s wage 
restraint policy in the so-called Winter of Discontent.50  The Conservative government 
consciously set about to destroy the power of unions and undermine collective bargaining as part 
of a broader strategy of promoting neo-liberal restructuring of the British economy.  Beginning 
                                                 
49 See generally, Douglas Brodie, A History of British Labour Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003); KD Ewing (ed), The Right to 
Strike: From the Trade Disputes Act 1906 to a Trade Union Freedom Bill 2006 (Institute for Employment Rights, Liverpool 
2006). 
50 Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005), ch 4. 
16 
 
in 1980, the government passed a series of laws that made industrial action increasingly difficult.  
Trade union immunity for secondary action was stripped away, as was immunity for disputes 
that were not narrowly confined to immediate terms and conditions of work.  Secondary 
picketing became unlawful and limits were placed on the number of pickets.  Strike ballots were 
made mandatory and their requirements became stricter and more complex over time.  Unions 
that failed to comply with the letter of the increasingly labrynthine law faced liability for 
damages resulting from an improperly called strike.  Unions were required to prevent unlawful 
action by their members or face liability and a legal presumption was later enacted that industrial 
action was endorsed by the union unless it explicitly repudiated it, in which case the employer 
could selectively discipline the participants.  Finally, all this statutory regulation provided courts 
with ample opportunities to become involved in strikes by issuing interlocutory injunctions.  The 
combination of growing economic insecurity, more adverse labour laws and major strike defeats, 
including the 1984 miner’s strike, contributed to a major drop in strike frequency in the 1980s 
and 1990s.51 
The election of a New Labour government in 1997 did not produce a distinctly different 
approach to strike regulation.  Some greater employment protection was offered to employees 
engaged in union-endorsed strikes, undertaken for statutorily approved goals and complying with 
the balloting and notice requirements, but the government did little to alter the highly restrictive 
web of statutory rules that must be complied with for strikes to be protected, although the courts 
recently indicated they may interpret these statutory requirements less strictly than they have in 
the past.52  Nothing has been done to loosen the tight limits on picketing.  Bob Simpson aptly 
summarized the situation: “Unions have the right to organize industrial action only when they 
have taken extensive steps to minimise its impact.”53 
Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand broke with the prevailing common law approach to collective 
bargaining when it turned to the arbitration model in the late-nineteenth century and consolidated 
it in the early twentieth.  The arbitration model relied on a mixture of negotiation, conciliation 
and arbitration.  In the event a dispute was not resolved through negotiation or conciliation, 
either party could refer the matter to a tribunal which issued an award that set terms and 
conditions of employment that were not only binding on the parties, but that either applied across 
an occupation and industry and covered both unionized and non-union employees (as in New 
Zealand) or were made to apply by unions getting employers named in awards (as in Australia).  
One of the keys to the political success of the award system was its role in substantially reducing 
strikes.  Registered unions were given the power to represent both members and non-members 
within their jurisdiction.  Awards were enforced by an industrial relations inspectorate, assisted 
and, in some cases, largely supplanted by union officials who enjoyed wide powers of entry to 
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speak to workers and monitor award compliance. Strikes were seen as unnecessary in such a 
system.  Industrial relations statutes sometimes banned industrial action as did some awards, 
making unions liable for damages. As well, unions faced common law liabilities for unlawful 
industrial action and secondary action was prohibited by trade practices legislation. In practice, 
the award system did not prevent strikes, especially in Australia, and the legal sanctions for 
unlawful strikes were rarely invoked.54 
The demise of the award system was part of a neo-liberal project aimed at deconstructing 
institutional arrangements that insulated employment conditions from market forces.  However, 
the move to a de-centralized collective bargaining system that was more responsive to market 
conditions also required a market-based dispute resolution mechanism, which led to legal 
recognition of the right to strike.  But in this context, the right to strike had to be tailored to 
insure that it did not empower unions to disrupt the economy in any significant way.  Thus, there 
was a dual movement, legal recognition of strikes one the one hand but only within very narrow 
and effectively enforced limits on the other, the latter “smothering” the former, 55 albeit more 
completely in Australia than New Zealand, particularly after the most recent wave of legislative 
reforms. 
In New Zealand, the concept of a lawful strike was first introduced in 1987 but was 
substantially revised in the context of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991, which aimed to de-
unionize workplaces and limit collective bargaining.  Strikes were broadly defined to include 
almost any concerted action that interfered with the performance of work, the effect of which is 
to bring most forms of collective worker action within the restrictive strike regime.  Strikes were 
unlawful if they occurred while a collective agreement was in force; they could not occur until a 
period of bargaining had elapsed; and secondary and sympathy strikes were prohibited, as were 
coordinated strikes for pattern bargaining and political strikes.  Unlawful strikes could be 
enjoined by the courts and participants could be sued for damages and possibly dismissed.  The 
strike regime was liberalized by the Labour government’s Employment Relations Act in 2000.  
Strikes for multi-employer agreements were permitted and, most importantly, significant 
restrictions on the use of replacement workers were imposed.  These legislative changes, 
however, have had not prevented union density and strike frequency from declining.56 
The strike regime implemented in Australia is more restrictive than the New Zealand one.  
A restrictive legal right to strike was first introduced in 1993 and then modified in 1996.  It was 
the 2005 Work Choices Act, however, that dramatically altered the industrial relations regime 
and greatly increased the restrictions of lawful strike activity.  As in New Zealand, industrial 
action is broadly defined. Before engaging in industrial action, a union must apply for permission 
to conduct a ballot. A condition of obtaining permission is that the union must demonstrate that it 
had been and continues to be genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer.  If 
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permission is granted, the union must arrange for an independent third party to conduct a secret 
ballot authorizing the proposed action.  If the action is approved, the union must provide three 
days notice to the employer and the strike must commence within 30 days of the ballot or the 
ballot must be conducted again.  Strikes cannot be conducted for pattern bargaining, and mid-
term strikes, sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts and political strikes are prohibited.  Picketing 
cannot impede the movement of goods and persons in and out of workplaces and injunctions and 
damages are available to remedy unlawful action.  A cooling-off period can be ordered on the 
request of one of the parties and a strike can be stopped if it is determined that it is causing 
significant harm to a third party, the bargaining parties themselves or to essential services (which 
includes the economy itself).  Payment by the employer for periods of industrial action is 
prohibited, even as part of a settlement.  In 2009 a Labour government enacted the Fair Work 
Act, which provides more support for collective bargaining but does not substantially change the 
strike regime.57   
Conclusion 
Our brief survey of legal regimes reveals that different jurisdictions have taken different 
approaches to the legal regulation of strikes.  In Canada and the United States, the law regulating 
strikes has changed very little, perhaps because under the existing collective bargaining regimes 
unions were faring so poorly there was little apparent need to create even more restrictive ones.  
A partial exception to this pattern is in the public sector, where trade union densities have 
remained much stronger.  In Canada exceptional interventions to prohibit or end strikes have 
occurred more frequently, while in the United States the focus has been on undermining strike 
alternatives, such as interest arbitration.  By contrast, in the UK, New Zealand and Australia, 
legislation was enacted to de-collectivize industrial relations and impose highly restrictive strike 
regimes.  Thus it might be fair to say that law has played a more direct and significant role in 
these countries, but it is doubtful that changes in the law are the primary reason for the decline in 
strikes.  Rather, it is more accurate to say that in jurisdictions where the law was not an effective 
buffer against market forces (Canada and the US), there was little need to change the law, while 
in jurisdictions where strong unions operated with legal immunities (UK) or where industrial 
relations regimes insulated workers against market forces (AU & NZ), legal changes were made 
to undercut trade union power and impose more restrictive strike regimes.  
3. The Future of Strikes 
Given the demise of the strike, what is to be done?  One answer might be that nothing is 
to be done.  Strikes have disappeared because the sources of conflict have diminished and the 
sources of peace have become more significant.  The unitarist perspective has triumphed.58 This 
seems unlikely in a world in which workers have seen their share of socially produced wealth 
decline and their standard of living is under attack.  A more realistic starting point is that workers 
are frequently dissatisfied with their terms and conditions of work, but that strike activity is 
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depressed because workers are also disorganized and disempowered.  That dissatisfaction may 
remain latent or manifest itself in informal or non-union forms of collective action that do not 
develop into strikes or individualized forms of resistance or dysfunction.  Where workers do act 
in these ways, individually or collectively, there is little evidence it leads to a successful 
resolution of the problem(s) they encountered, let alone fulfills the democratic or class-
consciousness development functions of strikes.59  If that is the case, there is indeed an urgent 
need to consider how collective worker voice might ‘strike’ again. 
One focus might be on reforming laws that make strikes particularly difficult to win and 
risky to conduct.   In the United States, for example, there is no doubt that the right of employers 
to hire permanent replacement workers, in conjunction with greater opportunities and motivation 
to do so, has undermined the ability of unionized workers to strike successfully.60 In some 
countries, appeals to constitutional protection of freedom of association, whether in national or 
transnational law, may provide some leverage in limiting state restrictions on the freedom to 
strike, but the road ahead is uncertain.61  In any event, as we have seen, unfavourable laws are 
not the primary cause of the demise of strikes, and so it can be anticipated that the impact of 
legislative reform or sympathetic constitutional interpretation would be modest.  
Another possible area is the development of new strategies and tactics.  Traditional 
strikes were successful in a world in which the collective withdrawal of labour inflicted or 
threatened to inflict significant economic costs on employers so that they preferred to settle on 
terms more favourable to the union. Moreover, through the act of striking, workers learned the 
practice of solidarity and were themselves transformed and made more class conscious.  If 
traditional strikes no longer provide workers with leverage or collective voice, then new forms of 
collective action should be developed.  Workplace occupations, bossnappings and corporate 
campaigns have been identified as alternatives to traditional strikes, but as Gregor Gall 
concludes, “So thus far, even sympathetic and engaged observers would have to conclude that 
the ability of organised labour to offer widespread, let alone effective resistance has been shown 
to be badly wanting.”62 
Part of the problem is that unions have been shaped by the legal frameworks in which 
they operate.  As a result, they often became narrowly focused on pursuing the interests of their 
members through collective bargaining and developed a repertoire of actions, permitted within 
the legal framework, to advance those interests.  Reforming the legal framework and expanding 
the repertoire while keeping the same narrow focus is unlikely to lead to much change.  Perhaps 
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what is needed is a more fundamental shift that would see unions trying to rebuild as working-
class movements more broadly focused on organizing and advancing the interests of working 
people outside of the framework of contract unionism.63  Strikes may be an important vehicle for 
the achievement of these goals.  Notable in this regard have been one-day strikes by Walmart 
and fast-food workers demanding higher wages, even though there is no prospect that they will 
be organized into dues paying bargaining units.64 
Finally, there is the turn to international solidarity.  Strikes were effective when the 
geographic scope of worker organization matched that of their employers.  If locally organized 
unions could take on local, immobile employers and national industrial unions could take on 
national manufacturers, then international worker institutions are necessary to take on globally 
organized employers. No doubt this is correct and while global labour solidarity is being 
constructed, its slow pace and the difficulties facing this project leave little room for optimism 
that a globally organized working class is going to become the vehicle for collective worker 
voice and resistance in the near or medium-term future.65 
Perhaps the answer to the question of what is to be done is that there is no good answer at 
this juncture.  Reforming the law of strikes, launching constitutional challenges to restrictive 
strike laws, developing innovative strategies and tactics and building international solidarity are 
all important projects that may help open up more space for collective worker voice now and in 
the future, but the inhospitable socio-economic climate severely limits what can be achieved.  
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